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Voter turnout is frequently cited as gauging a polity￿s health. The ease
with which electoral members produce political support can, however,
retard an economy￿s productive capacity. For example, while mobile
electorates might eﬃcaciously monitor political agents, they may also
lack credibility when committing to regulatory policies. Consequently,
a "healthy" polity￿s economy can rest at an inferior discretionary equi-
librium. I develop evidence that the US telecommunications sector may
indeed have realized such an outcome. This evidence is remarkably diﬃ-
cult to dismiss as an artifact of endogeneity bias.
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1Can Voting Reduce Welfare?
Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector
Abstract
Voter turnout is frequently cited as gauging a polity￿s health. The
ease with which electoral members produce political support can,
however, retard an economy￿s productive capacity. For example,
while mobile electorates might eﬃcaciously monitor political agents,
they may also lack credibility when committing to regulatory poli-
cies. Consequently, a "healthy" polity￿s economy can rest at an
inferior discretionary equilibrium. I develop evidence that the US
telecommunications sector may indeed have realized such an out-
come. This evidence is remarkably diﬃc u l tt od i s m i s sa sa na r t i f a c t
of endogeneity bias.
2Democratic governments must be responsive to the desires of voters,
and so they must ￿nd it diﬃcult to commit to stable policies over
time (Marceau and Smart (46)).
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Evidence from the turnout and distribution literature suggests that "mobile
electorates" (i.e., political principals who exhibit strong voting propensities)
recognize favorable policy distributions. V. O. Key￿s (40) seminal inquiry, for
example, produced evidence that constituents￿ policy treatment is sensitive to
how electoral institutions in￿uence voting costs. Extending this work, Rob
Fleck ((26), (27)) ￿nds that depression-era distributive policy favored mobile
electorates. Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess (11) develop related evidence
on government-responsiveness in India, while others uncover such evidence from
industrial organization applications. James Hamilton (33), for example, reports
that mobile North Carolinians faced a signi￿cantly reduced probability of realiz-
ing expanded hazardous waste facilities. And more immediately related to the
present article￿s application, Dino Falaschetti (23) ￿nds that end-user prices for
local exchange telecommunications services are signi￿cantly lower in US states
that house high-turnout electorates.
In this light, electoral mobility appears to signi￿cantly in￿uence distributive
policy.1 This appearance, in turn, can motivate democracy-advocates to argue
(at least implicitly) that electoral participation monotonically increases welfare.2
1It is important to note that the post-Key evidence cited above comes to us from pliable
policies - i.e., policies over which electoral constituents￿ preferences point in the same direction.
Here, the capacity for electoral constituents as a whole to produce political support, not the
mobilization of any particular constituency, appears in￿uential. Besley and Burgess (11, p.
1441) rationalize this phenomenon as emanating from electoral threats being more credible
"where states have a greater tradition of turning out to vote." Douglas Arnold (6) oﬀers a
similar rationalization.
2Prominent organizations such as the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(IDEA), for example, characterize strategies that would increase electoral participation as
being dominant. A recent IDEA conference on "Building Electoral Participation" is illus-
trative. Associated details are available from http://www.idea.int/whatsnew/whatsnew.html
(accessed July 31, 2003). The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) oﬀers
a similarly unquali￿ed assessment of participation￿s capacity to produce "government respon-
siveness and accountability" (e.g., see http://www.ifes.org//civil_society/description.html,
accessed October 30, 2003).
3While such participation might make representatives "better" political agents,
however, its prospect can also check electoral members￿ capacity to commit
against expropriating their economic agents￿ output. Evidence that I develop
in the present article suggests that this second eﬀect can indeed overwhelm the
￿rst. In particular, it suggests that electoral mobility can check an economy’s
productive capacity by weakening regulatory commitments that might otherwise
encourage investment.
To be sure, my argument here is not that electoral participation necessarily
reduces welfare, but rather that it can move economies towards inferior discre-
tionary equilibria. We can see this distinction more clearly by considering a
model of rent seeking through regulation (e.g., see Gary Becker (9); Sam Peltz-
man (55); and George Stigler (66)).3 Left unopposed, ￿rms pressure political
agents to push prices to their monopoly levels.4 Mobile electorates, on the
other hand, can counter this force. If, for example, the weight with which po-
litical agents consider constituents￿ preferences increases with constituents￿ ca-
pacity to produce political support,5 and if electoral members￿ unit of support
is a vote, then mobility should drag prices away from their monopoly levels,
increase output, and thus increase the economy￿s total surplus. Here, elec-
toral mobility enhances welfare by essentially constraining producers￿ pursuit of
surplus-reducing regulatory rents.
But making politicians "better" agents also increases regulated subjects￿ ex-
posure to electoral expropriation. Indeed, the "institutions and commitment"
literature already suggests that political agents￿ capacity to initiate ex post re-
distributions curbs productive activity.6 So shouldn￿t that same capacity for
3Thomas Lyon (45) employs a related framework to distinguish whether electricity regula-
tion￿s migration from municipalities to states re￿ects utilities￿ capacity to capture regulators
or political agents￿ incentive to strengthen regulatory commitments.
4Opposing ￿rms might, nevertheless, produce policy equilibria that are close to electoral
constituents￿ ideals (e.g., see Arthur Denzau and Michael Munger (19)). I explicitly control
for this potential in my empirical investigation.
5Bernheim and Whinston (10) show that just such a capacity in￿uences distributions in
common-agency, menu-auction games, such as those that are played between utility regulators
and interested support constituencies.
6See, for example, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2); Falaschetti
(24); Witold Henisz (36); Brian Levy and Pablo Spiller (43); Douglass North (49), (50); North
and Barry Weingast (51); Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi (58); and
4electoral principals exert a related force? For example, if electoral principals￿
capacity to shift resources in￿uences property right stability, then evidence on
turnout￿s distributional implications may re￿ect electorates￿ ability to expropri-
ate associated investors￿ product. Here, voting costs might enhance electoral
constituents’ capacity to commit against playing time inconsistent strategies,
rather than simply reduce their capacity to counter organized interests￿ weight
in a political agent￿s objective.
Whether electoral mobility enhances welfare in any particular application
thus appears to be an important, open, and empirical question. I address
this question here by evaluating how telecommunications capital varies with
voter turnout across US states. The US telecom-sector oﬀers an especially rich
empirical setting in which to pursue this investigation.7 Service-producers incur
extensive sunk costs while facing (as well as generating) considerable political
forces. These forces, in turn, vary across states. For example, a state￿s local
exchange carriers (LECs) do not set prices alone, but rather do so in concert with
associated public utility commissioners (PUCs). Electoral members, in turn,
have several channels available through which to in￿uence associated regulatory
processes (e.g., oﬀering contingent support to relevant political agents). To the
extent that these members can jointly produce political support, say through
turning out to vote, they can either (i) check service providers￿ political pressure
or (ii) opportunistically decrease LECs￿ ability to recognize their investments￿
product.8
If electoral constituents simply weigh against organized pressure groups in a
political agent￿s static objective, then capital can increase with turnout. Here,
electoral mobility can push regulated prices towards their competitive levels
and thus increase output from its otherwise inferior monopoly level. On the
David Stasavage (65).
7Besley and Anne Case (12) review the more general bene￿ts of employing a cross-state in-
stitutional analysis to understand related political economy questions. Spiller (64) highlights
the value of studying commitment problems via applications to utilities.
8Throughout the paper, I refer to opportunistic actions as those that strategically ex-
ploit ex-post bargaining positions and thus curb rational agents￿ ex-ante incentives to enter
otherwise mutually bene￿cial transactions.
5other hand, if electoral mobility re￿ects political principals￿ capacity to expro-
priate sunk investments￿ product, then capital should decrease with turnout.
Here, just as political agents￿ ability to strategically exploit ex-post bargaining
positions appears to retard real activity in the institutions and commitment
literature, political principals￿ lack of commitment-capacity would also reduce
welfare.
My present data oﬀer robust evidence that forces associated with this second
case overwhelm those associated with the ￿rst. In particular, they suggest that
local exchange carriers employ signiﬁcantly smaller capital stocks in US states
that house high-turnout electorates. Since these capital stocks are subject to
price cap regulation (as opposed to, say, rate of return regulation), this rela-
tionship is unlikely to evidence electoral mobility￿s capacity to enhance welfare
by checking regulatory distortions. Moreover, this relationship is remarkably
diﬃcult to dismiss as an artifact of endogeneity bias. For example, a sig-
ni￿cant and negative relationship between turnout and capital persists when
I instrument for turnout via an electoral institution proxy.9 An overidenti-
￿cation test supports this strategy￿s merits by suggesting that this proxy can
con￿dently be excluded from the regressor-set (i.e., it does not share an inde-
pendent relationship with telecommunications capital). Other considerations
of omitted variables bias (OVB) corroborate this suggestion. Indeed, for capi-
tal￿s signi￿cant and negative relationship with turnout to be artifactual in this
regard, unobservables would have to explain over three times the variation of
interest as do my observables.10 OVB also appears innocuous in light of the
capital-turnout relationship￿s remarkable stability across numerous alternative
speci￿cations of the regressor matrix. This stability is unlikely to exist if un-
observed variables truly account for turnout￿s relationship with capital in the
present data. Finally, support for my identi￿cation strategy￿s validity comes
from the bootstrapped distribution of my instrumental variable (IV) estimate, as
well as a non-parametric matching estimator, both of which con￿dently suggest
9This proxy is an indicator of whether states allow election day registration.
10This treatment of OVB draws on Joseph Altonji, Todd Elder, and Christopher Taber￿s
(4) recent innovation for evaluating causation from non-experimental data.
6that my measured relationship between capital and turnout is not a sample-size
artifact.
While potentially new, though, this evidence may not be surprising. In-
deed, if valid evidence exists that political agents￿ discretionary capacity can
retard real activity, then it should also exist for those agents￿ principals. One
should be careful, however, about interpreting the present research￿s normative
implications. For example, they do not say that restricting the franchise is a
dominant strategy. Rather, they simply highlight the potential for political dis-
cretion, whether it is placed with electoral principals or their agents, to retard
real activity.11 Understanding this implication is nevertheless important since
much (if not all) of the literature￿s attention aims at strategically organizing
the institutional landscapes on which agents play political games. Evidence
reported here suggests that electoral constituents￿ relative bargaining power is
also a salient consideration.12
I develop this evidence more fully in the article￿s remainder. In the fol-
lowing section, I motivate my empirical investigation by showing that a posi-
tive relationship between electoral mobility and regulated capital can evidence
turnout￿s capacity to improve welfare. I also show, however, that a negative
relationship can evidence turnout￿s capacity to decrease welfare, and argue that
the telecommunications sector oﬀers a rich setting in which to formally evaluate
this capacity￿s empirical importance. I carry out this evaluation in Section 3,
and ￿nd robust evidence for turnout￿s capacity to reduce total surplus. I con-
clude in Section 4 by relating this evidence to that appearing in the institutions
and commitment literature and considering opportunities for future research.
11I thank Gary Miller for encouraging this interpretation.
12Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Trebbi (3) also call attention to this consideration
- e.g., see their section on "insulation, inequality, and voting rights." Nicolas Marceau and
Michael Smart (46, p. 241) oﬀer the related observation that "Democratic governments must
be responsive to the desires of voters, and so they may ￿nd it diﬃcult to commit to stable
policies over time." Their investigation turns, however, to how corporate lobbying can work
against electoral constituents￿ contribution to the "capital levy problem."
72 Theoretical Motivation
2.1 Electoral Mobility and Distributional Policy
Contributors to the "turnout and distribution" literature argue that voter turnout
measures electoral constituents￿ capacity to produce political support, and that
the prospect of ful￿lling this capacity in￿uences distributive policy. Hamilton
(33), for example, draws on positive political theory (e.g., see Riker and Or-
deshook (57)) to argue that turnout re￿ects electoral constituents￿ capacity to
act collectively, and that the prospect of instigating such action in￿uences pub-
lic choices to expand hazardous waste facilities. Fleck (26) motivates related
insights via a model where "winning the approval of a group of citizens has a
larger eﬀect on reelection if those citizens vote in large numbers than if they
do not." These contributions formalize Key￿s (40) early intuitions about how
electoral mobility in￿uences policy, and subsequent contributions (e.g., Douglas
Arnold (6)) that cite as in￿uential the potential for electorates to be mobilized,
rather than the characteristics of those who might actually be mobilized.
Here, the capacity for electoral members to act collectively can push even
multi-dimensional platforms towards those members￿ ideal points on pliable di-
mensions - i.e., dimensions on which their preferences point in the same direc-
tion. My objective for the present paper is to evaluate whether this apparent
in￿uence on distributive policy might also aﬀect welfare. I begin to pursue this
objective in the present section by showing that electoral mobility can either
expand or contract an economy￿s total surplus, and that whether an economy
maintains either of these normative properties is observable. In the following
section, I then develop evidence that electoral mobility may have contracted
available surplus from the US telecommunications sector.
82.2 Electoral Mobility, Pressure Group Politics, and So-
cial Welfare
Consider a single-￿rm economy where a demand curve D summarizes consumers￿
budgets and preferences and a marginal cost curve MC summarizes the ￿rm￿s
technology. If this ￿rm operates in a competitive market, then prices and quan-
tities will rest at their welfare maximizing levels - i.e., p∗ and q∗, respectively.
But what if, rather than being governed by competitive forces, prices that
face our ￿rm are governed by political forces? For example, what if a political
agent takes as its objective the following extension of Peltzman￿s (55) "majority
generating function"
M (αp,(1 − α)π) (1)
where p denotes the "price" that electoral constituents face for the ￿rm￿s output,
π denotes the supplier￿s pro￿t, and α ∈ [0,1] denotes the relative capacity
for electoral constituents to produce political support (i.e., α re￿ects electoral
constituents￿ voting propensity)?13
This setup essentially pits electoral constituents against producer interests in
a "menu auction" game a la Bernheim and Whinston (10).14 Here, distribution
of the "prize" p will depend on bidders￿ capacity to produce political support
(i.e., α). If, for example, electoral constituents exhibit zero capacity to produce
support (i.e., α =0 ), a political agent would ful￿ll its objective (1) by maximiz-
ing the ￿rm￿s pro￿ts - i.e., by setting price p to its monopoly-level pM.15 The
following ￿gure illustrates this phenomenon, and others that I examine below.
–—Insert Figure 1 Here–—
13M ⊂ C2, M1 < 0, M11 > 0, M2 > 0, M22 < 0, θ ∈ [0, 1],a n dπ = f (p).
14Bernheim and Whinston (10) examine a "menu auction game" where political agents fully
allocate ￿xed costs between competing interests, and interests attempt to in￿uence agents by
oﬀering political support "menus" (i.e., lists of support that groups supply as a function of
agents￿ feasible actions). In this setting, interested constituencies in￿uence agents￿ decisions
according to their capacity to produce support.
15Given that dπ
dp < 0 for p>p M,a n dM1 < 0, a rational agent will never set price above
pM.
9As electoral constituents￿ capacity to produce support increases (i.e., as
α −→ 1), however, our agent￿s objective places increasing weight on the elec-
toral constituency￿s welfare.16 Given M￿s curvature properties, such move-




, this decrease will encourage our pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm to
continuously increase output. Over this range, an increase in electoral mo-
bility will decrease price and increase output towards its welfare maximizing
level. Here, electoral mobility increases welfare by dragging price towards its
competitive level and thus exhibits a positive relationship with output.
For ease of reference, I restate this implication as Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1: If electorates￿ capacity to produce political support
(i.e., votes) increases welfare, then equilibrium quantity should in-
crease with increases in electoral mobility.
It is type of relationship on which popular normative assessments of electoral
mobility appear to rest. Here, electoral mobility rationalizes empirical results
from the "turnout and distribution" literature by pushing a pliable policy in
a direction that favors electoral preferences. Moreover, the manner in which
mobility increases an economy￿s total surplus appears consistent with this liter-
ature￿s popular normative readings.
Nevertheless, a political agent who takes the majority generating function
1 as its objective need not stop lowering price when it reaches the welfare-
maximizing level p∗. To see this implication, simply consider the extreme
case where electorates are perfectly mobile. Here, a maximizing political agent
will ignore producer interests and cater only to those of consumer electorates
-i . e . ,α =1 . But just as the perfect agent of producers will set price at a
level above that which maximizes total surplus (i.e., pM), the perfect agent
of consumers will set price at a level below that which maximizes total surplus
(i.e., the "discretionary" price pD). In other words, electoral mobility decreases
16This evaluation implicitly assumes that turnout is exogenous. I formally address this
assumption in my empirical investigation.
10welfare by pushing price below its competitive level and thus exhibits a negative
relationship with output. I restatet h i si m p l i c a t i o na sH y p o t h e s i s2 .
Hypothesis 2: If electorates￿ capacity to produce political support
(i.e., votes) decreases welfare, then equilibrium quantity should de-
crease with increases in electoral mobility.
Thus far, my motivation for these hypotheses restricts attention to the neigh-
borhood of "perfect agent" equilibria - i.e., prices that would maximize either
producer or consumer surplus. But this restriction does not sacri￿ce my hy-
potheses￿ generality. Consider, for example, an initial equilibrium where regu-
lated prices rest above their competitive counterparts, but below corresponding
monopoly prices. Now suppose that increasing electoral mobility leaves equi-
librium prices above their competitive levels. In this case, we will continue to
observe a positive relationship between mobility and quantity, and this relation-
ship will continue to evidence the capacity for mobility to improve welfare - i.e.,
Hypothesis 1 remains valid. Alternatively, suppose that increasing mobility
induces a new equilibrium where prices fall short of their competitive counter-
parts. In this case, an observed positive relationship between mobility and
quantity will continue to evidence a shrinking of deadweight loss triangles and
thus a welfare improvement - i.e., the validity of Hypothesis 1 persists. Only
when increasing mobility pushes equilibrium prices so far below their compet-
itive counterparts that equilibrium quantity decreases would we see evidence
that mobility can lower welfare - i.e., Hypothesis 2 remains valid.
In addition, these implications are robust to my assumption that the policy
space is unidimensional (i.e., p ∈ R+). To see this robustness, consider a
multi-dimensional policy-space X ⊆ Rn (n>1), where the ￿rst dimension
represents a "pliable" policy - i.e., one on which consumer preferences point in
the same direction. In addition, suppose that an appropriate generalization
of the majority generating function 1 (i.e., one that maps a multi-dimensional
policy space into R)s a t i s ￿es the condition of "weak Pareto" (e.g., see Austen-
Smith and Banks (7)). Finally, suppose that a "platform" D∗ ∈ X maximizes
11this generalized function when electoral preferences receive a weight of α =
α1. Then, if the weight that our political agent places on electoral preferences
increases to α2 >α 1, the agent could increase its "majority" by choosing a




1 ∈ R denotes the optimal choice
of the platform￿s ￿rst dimension under diﬀerent levels of electoral mobility j.I n
other words, holding all other policy considerations constant, the political agent
optimally responds to increases in electoral mobility by moving its platform
towards the electorate￿s pliable preferences.
2.3 Electoral Mobility and Regulatory Commitment
Hypothesis 2￿s normative implication is closely related to that which appears
in the "institutions and commitment" literature. There, authors are concerned
about how political agents￿ discretionary capacity can retard welfare. But
if agent-discretion can induce an economy to rest at an inferior equilibrium,
then principal-discretion should also be able to induce such an equilibrium.
Moreover, if agency costs decrease with increases in electoral members￿ capacity
to produce political support, then mobile electorates should be most susceptible
to creating this diﬃculty.
We can see this relationship more clearly perhaps by thinking of my static
pressure group model as the reduced form of a dynamic inconsistency model.
Consider, for example, a model in the spirit of Finn Kydland and Edward
Prescott (42) where consumers in￿uence regulated-prices via their capacity to
mobilize, and ￿rms employ factors to the extent that promised remuneration is
credible. Here, consumer-electorates solve the following two-period problem.
max
p1 ,p 2
{S (k1 ,k 2 ,p 1 ,p 2)} (2)
subject to
k1 = K1 (p1 ,p 2) (3)
12k2 = K2 (k1 ,p 2) (4)
where social welfare S ⊂ C2 increases at a decreasing rate with capital kt and
decreases at a decreasing rate with output prices pt (t =1 , 2), while producers￿
induced capital choices Kt ⊂ C2 increase in each of their arguments. Evaluated
at welfare maximizing prices (p∗
1,p ∗





















To the extent that mobility expands electorates￿ capacity to strategically
act on ex-post bargaining positions, however, voters will "replan" in period 2
by solving equation (2) subject to the following constraints.
p1 = p1 (6)






For an interior solution, the price pd
2 (where d denotes "discretionary") that
maximizes welfare (2) subject to constraints (6, 7, and 8) must fall short of that
which maximizes welfare subject to constraints (3 and 4) - i.e., pd
2 <p ∗
2.T h i s
relationship follows from pd









(rather than that of equation 5) and the curvature properties assumed for S
and Kt.
Interpreted within this model, electoral mobility checks political principals￿
capacity to commit to the optimal plan (p∗
1,p ∗
2), thus leaving them at the infe-





t −→ Sd <S ∗). Considering pressure group
competition within this dynamic framework creates a qualitatively identical ob-
servable implication to that which Hypothesis 2 summarizes. Here, just as in
the static pressure group model, the "distance" between electoral constituents
and their political agents decreases with electorates￿ capacity to produce votes.
This model￿s dynamics highlight, however, that reducing agency costs increases
regulated producers￿ exposure to re-contracting risk.
2.4 Implications for the Telecommunications Sector
The telecommunications sector oﬀers a rich non-experimental setting in which to
formally evaluate whether electoral mobility can indeed create such an exposure
and thus potentially retard social welfare. My theoretical motivation suggests
that any such sector should be one in which consumers￿ capacity to produce
political support in￿uences regulated prices, and the prospect for opportunistic
price-setting exposes producers to a capital levy problem. The telecommunica-
tions sector appears attractive on each of these counts. For example, producing
access to telecom networks employs a (physical) capital intensive technology. In
short, local exchange companies (LECs) connect end-users to switching plants
via "loops." A loop generally consists of a pair of twisted copper wires and
the portion of associated infrastructure-capacity that these wires consume (e.g.,
trench and telephone pole space). LECs incur both initial and recurring costs
to build and maintain loops and recover some of these costs via connection
and line charges (Steve Parsons (53)). If capital employment is sensitive to
expectations about recovering these costs, then political forces that in￿uence
telecommunications prices in general, and end-user connection and line charges
in particular, have a channel through which to exert real eﬀects.
Telecommunications prices indeed appear subject to such forces. For exam-
ple, while Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) ultimately set relevant prices,17
17Regulatory jurisdiction over telecommunications policy is split between the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) and state public utility or public corporation commissions.
States maintain authority over most rates charged to customers for local exchange services.
Jurisdiction over long-distance services is split, on the other hand, with the FCC regulating
14interested groups in general, and electoral constituents in particular, can exert
signi￿cant in￿uence. Groups might oﬀer to elected commissioners contributions
or votes contingent on relevant prices. They might also oﬀer contingent support
to governors and legislators who, in turn, can in￿uence prices via the appoint-
ment process.18 Finally, whether commissioners are elected or appointed, in-
terested groups might in￿uence prices by contingently supporting governors and
legislators who, in turn, can sway commissioners by altering a PUC￿s regulatory
authority or budget.19 These institutional features oﬀer ample opportunity for
interested players, "within a single political jurisdiction," to "adjust rates in
order to achieve political goals" (Brock (15)).
Roger Noll (48) identi￿es an additional channel through which state-speci￿c
political forces can in￿uence telecom prices. In particular, he argues that the
"principal source of challengers to incumbent federal legislators is
state and local government. Governors and big-city mayors run for
the Senate, and state legislators and other local oﬃcials run for the
House. To the extent that the basic exchange rate becomes a salient
political issue at the state and local level, incumbent legislators could
become vulnerable to challenges based in part on their association
with the big increases in telephone prices" (48, emphasis added).
That political agents can reasonably expect this issue to become salient is evi-
dent, for example, in Representative Timothy Wirth￿s (D, CO) early 1980s elec-
tion fortunes. While telecommunications policy is complex, residential users
can easily monitor its eﬀects on associated prices. Consequently, potential
challengers have a pliable and relatively transparent policy with which to mo-
bilize otherwise "inattentive publics." Challengers apparently employed this
interstate service and state regulatory or public utilities commissions regulating intrastate
service (Robert Harris and Jeﬀrey Kraft (34)).
18Nationwide, 12 states elect their public utility commissioners. Others employ an appoint-
ment process (Council of State Governments (18)).
19Since 1989, several states￿ legislatures have statutorily constrained utility commissions￿
authority over telecommunications rates and revenues (Nancy Zearfoss (71)). Gerald Brock
(15) argues that such channels for "micromanagement" eﬀectively transform elected legisla-
tors into "independent telecommunication policy makers" (independent, that is, of associated
regulators).
15issue against Wirth, a prominent advocate of telecommunications deregulation.
Indeed, when deregulation increased local exchange prices, Wirth￿s winning mar-
gin slipped by almost 10%. Wirth￿s principal assistant attributes this drop to
the price increase (Douglas Arnold (6)).
Other informal evidence also appears consistent with political agents being
sensitive to residential users￿ preferences over local service policy. For example,
as part of the telephone industry deregulation and breakup of AT&T, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) attempted to increase a component
of residential users￿ access fee by $6 per month. The House, however, voted
overwhelmingly to bar this increase￿s implementation. The proposed increase
￿was a visible, immediate addition to every customer￿s telephone
bill...It was thus relatively easy to create a ￿consumer rip-oﬀ￿i s s u e
alleging that this was a plan to help large businesses...at the expense
of ordinary consumers￿ (Brock (15)).
The Senate was about to concur with the House when the FCC postponed the
increase. Subsequently, the FCC implemented a $1.00 fee with increases phased
in annually (Arnold (6)).
The theoretical motivation for these anecdotes is that potentially mobile
electorates are unlikely to remain latent when policies on which their prefer-
ences agree (e.g., end-user prices) move against them. Falaschetti (23) sup-
ports this motivation with formal evidence that local exchange prices decrease
signi￿cantly with increases in electoral constituencies￿ capacity to produce po-
litical support. In this light, whether PUCs receive pressure directly from
electoral constituencies, or indirectly via federal and state legislators and exec-
utives, channels appear to exist through which electoral preferences can weigh
on telecommunications prices. If, in turn, these prices in￿uence LECs￿ asset
returns, then relevant capital levels should vary across states according to elec-
toral constituents￿ ability to act on those preferences (i.e., to produce political
support).
163 Empirical Examination
The institutional landscape on which interested individuals play telecom-policy
games oﬀers numerous channels through which electoral mobility can exert
downward pressure on service prices. Whether this distributive force expands
or contracts an economy￿s surplus, in turn, creates opposing observable impli-
cations. If turnout increases welfare in a competing pressure group model, and
given the capital-intensive technology with which local exchange services are
produced, turnout should exhibit a positive relationship with regulated capital.
A negative relationship between turnout and capital, on the other hand, evi-
dences inferior welfare levels in a model where mobility decreases electorates￿
capacity to commit against opportunistic expropriations. Whether turnout ex-
hibits a positive or negative relationship with telecommunications capital can
thus shed new light on the turnout and distribution literature￿s normative im-
plications.
3.1 Data
To evaluate this relationship, I examine how telecommunications capital stocks
vary with voter turnout across the contiguous US states.20 While several mea-
sures exist for these stocks, I focus on the variable Loops, which equals the
number of loops per 1,000 population that incumbent local exchange carriers
(ILECs), subject to price cap regulation, maintained on December 31, 2000.21
Table 1 summarizes this variable￿s distribution, as well as those for other vari-
ables introduced below.22
–—Insert Table 1 Here–—
20Faced with signi￿cant adjustment costs, LECs￿ investment tends to be discrete (personal
communication with Steve Parsons of Parsons Applied Economics). Electorates￿ capacity
to produce political support, on the other hand, exhibits little in the way of time series
variation (at least over the period for which telecommunications infrastructure data are readily
accessible). I thus identify this capacity￿s real eﬀects from its cross sectional variation with
accumulated investment.
21Recall that loops are land-line connections between end users and switching facilities.
22Appendix A collects in one place each variable￿s description.
17Loops re￿nes the dependent variable that Henisz and Bennet Zelner (37) use
in relating political executives￿ discretionary capacity to telecommunications in-
frastructure penetration. These authors attribute evidence of this capacity￿s
negative relationship with telecommunications penetration to a lack of formal
constraints on laggard-governments￿ "arbitrary behavior." An increased ca-
pacity for such behavior, however, can coincide with a superior technology for
monitoring investment. Regulators whose objective is consumer surplus, for ex-
ample, face relatively intense incentives to eﬃciently monitor under "used and
useful" rate of return regulation (Richard Gilbert and David Newbery (30)).
Hence, while Henisz and Zelner￿s evidence appears consistent with Hypothesis
2 (but at the level of political agent rather than that of electoral principal),
it may instead re￿ect a superior outcome where executive-monitoring checks
service providers￿ incentive to overinvest under regulatory distortions.23
By constraining itself to service providers who do not face such distortions
(i.e., price capped ILECs), Loops diminishes this alternative interpretation. In-
deed, removing the incentive for "over-capitalisation" is one of price cap (or "in-
centive") regulation￿s frequently purported bene￿ts, and the manner in which
US regulators have implemented incentive regulation appears to have, in large
part, facilitated these bene￿ts￿ realization (e.g., see David Sappington (60)).
Moreover, even in repeated games, regulators who take consumer surplus as their
objective face relatively intense pressure to act opportunistically under price cap
regulation (Gilbert and Newbery (30); Levy and Spiller (43); Spiller (64)). Ap-
plied to the telecommunications sector, such actions can be played by re-setting
prices "at the end of each price cap period to eliminate any extra-normal pro￿t,"
and thus induce relevant ￿rms to "rationally choose not to operate at peak ef-
￿ciency" (Sappington (60, p. 285)). Paolo Panteghini and Carlo Scarpa (52)
oﬀer illustrative examples of this phenomenon where UK regulators, "subject
to considerable political pressures," appear to have opportunistically decreased
utilities￿ output prices in just such a manner. In this light, the present investi-
23I thank Jonah Gelbach and Roger Noll for highlighting the importance of making this
distinction. Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson (8) oﬀer a seminal and formal treatment of
how regulation can create such distortions.
18gation appears capable of developing relatively clean inference about electoral
mobility￿s relationship to regulatory commitments.24
The independent variable of interest is Turnout, which equals the average
percentage of voting age individuals that cast ballots for the oﬃce of president
in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 general elections.25 Hypothesis 1 says that, if elec-
toral mobility enhances welfare, Loops should increase (ceteris paribus) with
Turnout. Hypothesis 2, on the other hand, suggests that a negative relation-
ship between Turnoutand Loops would re￿ect an inferior equilibrium. Figure
2 provides a coarse illustration of how the data are organized across these di-
mensions and preliminary evidence for Hypothesis 2.26
–—Insert Figure 2 Here–—
To evaluate this relationship more carefully, I control for demand and supply
side forces, as well as the capacity for interested individuals other than electoral
members to exert political in￿uence.27 In particular, I control for consumers￿
budget constraints and preferences by employing the variables PopulationDensity,
Education, Income, Poverty,a n dAge 65 as a set of demographic regressors.
To address supply side forces, I control for the costs that local exchange carriers
24In unreported regressions, I also evaluate electoral mobility￿s relationship to alternative
measures of telecommunications capital - i.e., a broader measure of capital employed to pro-
duce local exchange services and a measure of high speed infrastructure. Unlike Loops,t h e s e
substitute measures cannot distinguish whether the underlying assets are subject to price
cap regulation. They do, however, re￿ect capital to which individuals￿ welfare may appear
more immediately sensitive. Results from these regressions are largely consistent with those
reported below.
25By employing an average level of turnout, I attempt to reduce the error in measuring
each constituency￿s capacity to produce political support. Since my investigation is restricted
to cross-sectional data, employing any particular year￿s turnout would increase exposure to
potentially spurious year-speci￿c shocks. Nevertheless, in unreported regressions, results
reported here do not appear sensitive to employing any particular years￿ turnout as a regressor.
In addition, they do not appear sensitive to employing a longer run average (i.e., from 1960
through 2000) of turnout.
26This ￿gure also highlights potentially in￿uential outliers, such as the graph￿s most "north-
westerly" observation (i.e., Nevada). Regression results reported below are robust to omitting
this and other potentially in￿uential observations.
27Jaison Abel (1) formally develops a similar speci￿cation for a related application. U.
Sankar (59, Equation (10)) does so for electric utilities￿ desired level of capital stock - i.e., for
another sector where production technologies exhibit scale economies and limited scope for
substituting labor and capital.
19incur for maintaining loops via the regressor Loop Cost.28 Finally, I employ
the variables LEC Concentration, LD Concentration,a n dFortune 500 to
address the potential for LECs, long distance service providers, and businesses,
respectively, to exert either political or market in￿uence on relevant capital
stocks.
3.2 Identiﬁcation Strategy
To identify electoral mobility￿s relationship with telecommunications capital, I
employ the variable Election Day Registration (EDR)a sa ni n s t r u m e n ta n d
subject the consequent coeﬃcient estimate to numerous robustness checks.29
To facilitate valid inference, EDR must share a strong ￿rst stage or "reduced
form" relationship with Turnout (i.e., the potentially endogenous regressor),
but maintain no independent variation with Loops (i.e., it must be redundant
in the second stage or "structural" equation). Evidence appearing in the voter
turnout literature suggests that EDR is a "good" instrument, at least with
respect to this ￿rst criterion. For example, following Raymond Wol￿nger and
Steven Rosenstone￿s (68) seminal work, Besley and Case (12), Highton (38), and
Samuel Patterson and Gregory Caldeira (54) report evidence that registration
closing dates signi￿cantly in￿uence electoral mobility. Parameter estimates
disclosed in my Appendix B suggest that the present data exhibit a similar
relationship.
In this light, EDR appears to satisfy at least a minimal requirement for
being a valid instrument. However, for associated inference to be unbiased,
EDR must also be "excludable" - i.e., EDR must relate to Loops only through
Turnout. Besley and Case (12, Table 16) oﬀer some support for this exclud-
28Note that forces associated with the regressor PopulationDensity (e.g., loop length) can
also in￿uence relevant costs.
29EDR equals 1 for states where prospective voters can register on election day. In the
present sample, EDR states are Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Because North Dakota does not require registration, I also treat it as being a
member of this group. In unreported regressions, I follow Benjamin Highton (38) by coding
EDR to equal one only for states that are early adopters of this electoral institution (i.e.,
North Dakota, Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin). Inference from this alternative coding is
qualitatively identical to that reported here.
20ability via evidence that states may have randomly received the election day
registration "treatment." Here, EDR appears unrelated to changes in either
legislatures￿ political composition or states￿ demographic characteristics.
While this evidence is supportive, however, it does not alone warrant a strong
maintenance of EDR satisfying the exclusion restriction. I thus further evalu-
ate EDR￿s potential redundancy by adding an indicator of whether states hold
open primaries to the set of instruments (i.e., the variable Open Primary)a n d
testing the consequent overidenti￿cation restriction (i.e., evaluating whether the
over-identi￿ed estimate diﬀers signi￿cantly from its just-identi￿ed counterpart).
Open Primary￿s "￿rst stage validity" ￿nds support in Besley and Case￿s (12,
Table 5) evidence that general election turnout increases signi￿cantly with pri-
mary elections being open. Parameter estimates reported in my Appendix B
suggest that the present data also exhibit this strong ￿rst stage relationship.
Consequently, if both EDR and Open Primary satisfy the exclusion restric-
tion, then IV estimates from associated overidenti￿ed speci￿cations should not
diﬀer signi￿cantly from their just identi￿ed counterparts. Evidence that I re-
port in Table 2 (and discuss further below) is consistent with this diﬀerence
being negligible and thus furthers con￿dence that my IV estimates are valid.
I gain additional con￿dence that omitted variables are not problematic in
this regard by employing Altonji et al.￿s (4) recent innovation for evaluating
causation from non-experimental data. In short, this method lets me measure
how much of the coincident variation between Loops and Turnout would have
to be attributable to unobservables for OVB to completely rationalize a rela-
tionship like that illustrated in Figure 1. To the extent that unobservables
would have to explain "a lot" of this relationship (relative to observables), one
can gain con￿dence that channels do not exist through which an instrument and
dependent variable can vary independently. Pushing even further in this direc-
tion, I explicitly evaluate my IV (and OLS) estimates￿ robustness to "expanded"
regressor sets - i.e., those that include numerous potentially in￿uential, but oth-
erwise "unobserved," variables. Robustness here would oﬀer con￿dence that
ignoring the still myriad variables that I do not (and indeed cannot) explicitly
21consider creates little potential for biasing my coeﬃcient estimates. Evidence
from each of these expansions strongly corroborates that developed elsewhere
in this section - i.e., it suggests that Turnout￿s signi￿cant and negative relation-
ship with Loops evidences a real phenomenon rather than an artifact associated
with endogeneity bias.
Finally, I consider the potential for turnout￿s signi￿cant and negative re-
lationship with telecommunications capital to be a sample-size artifact. The
strength of my ￿rst stage regressions (reported in Appendix B) oﬀers some as-
surance that bias associated with the IV estimator￿s ￿nite sample properties
does not aﬄict inference from coeﬃcient estimates reported below (Angrist and
Krueger (5), Hahn and Hausman (32), and Jeﬀrey Wooldridge (69)). It does
so because ￿nite sample bias emerges from the "structural" and "reduced form"
regressions￿ errors being correlated, and thus grows as the ￿rst-stage regressions￿
goodness of ￿td e c r e a s e s . 30
To gain additional con￿dence here, I "re-sample" the present data 1,000
times to bootstrap my IV estimate￿s distribution. The resulting bias-corrected
estimate and con￿dence intervals are similar to those associated with my OLS
and IV estimates. Finally, I evaluate Turnout￿s relationship with Loops via the
"nearest neighbor" matching estimator. This nonparametric method is attrac-
tive here because its estimates do not rely on asymptotics for their validity.31
Nevertheless, it too returns evidence consistent with that from my parametric
estimates.
30Since this same correlation also biases the OLS estimator, the 2SLS estimator￿s ￿nite
sample properties can bias it towards its OLS counterpart.
31Its validity does rest, however, on only observables having selected states to receive the
EDR "treatment." For the matching estimator to facilitate valid inference, selection into the
set of EDR-states must be random in the sense that, conditioned on observables, outcomes
for treated and non-treated states diﬀer only from the electoral institution￿s in￿uence (e.g.,
see Richard Blundell and Monica Costa-Dias (14) and James Heckman, Hidehiko Ichimura,
and Petra Todd (35)). I implicitly address this dimension of the matching estimator￿s validity
when evaluating EDR￿s potential to violate the exclusion restriction - e.g., see my discussion
below of Altonji et al.￿s (4) method.
223.3 Reduced form Evidence
My evaluation of Hypotheses 1 versus 2 begins with reduced form evidence
of Turnout￿s relationship to Loops. I develop this evidence by estimating
parameters from the following model.
Loopsi = α0 + α1Turnout i +
XK
k=2 αkControlsk,i + u1i (10)
Results from this estimation, a representative sample of which are reported in
Table 2, appear consistent with Hypothesis 2 - i.e., at least on the margins eval-
uated here, they evidence a realized potential for electoral mobility to weaken
regulatory commitments and thus leave an economy (sector) at an inferior dis-
cretionary equilibrium.
–—Insert Table 2 Here–—
Regression (1) makes explicit the relationship that Turnout and Loops ex-
hibit in Figure 1. Here, Turnout￿s coeﬃcient estimate (i.e., -5.96) says that a
standard deviation increase in electoral mobility (i.e., Turnout￿s approximate
increase from Virginia to Michigan) is associated with just under a 1/3 stan-
dard deviation decrease in telecommunications capital (i.e., Loops￿ approximate
decrease from Virginia to Michigan).32
In regression (2), I begin to evaluate whether this relationship can be at-
tributed to endogeneity bias. I do so by controlling for both supply and de-
mand side forces, as well as in￿uences from potentially competing interests.
The coeﬃcient estimate on Turnout(i.e., -11.86), nevertheless, remains consis-
tent with Hypothesis 2. In particular, it suggests that a standard deviation
32Michigan is associated with the 15th highest level of Turnout in the present data, while
Virginia is associated with the 30th highest. A qualitatively similar relationship persists
throughout Turnout￿s distribution. For example, Turnout for Maine (i.e., the highest
Turnout state) is about one standard deviation above that for Vermont (i.e., the 5th highest
Turnout state), while its level of telecommunications capital (as measured by Loops)i sa l -
most a quarter of a standard deviation below Vermont￿s. On the distribution￿s opposite end,
Nevada￿s Turnout(i.e., the lowest Turnoutstate) is about one standard deviation below that
for Maryland (i.e., the 34th highest Turnoutstate), while its level of telecommunications cap-
ital (as measured by Loops) is over three-quarters of a standard deviation above Maryland￿s.
23increase in electoral mobility is associated with nearly a 2/3 standard deviation
decrease in telecommunications capital. I treat the potential for endogeneity
bias more generally in regression (3) by employing EDR as an instrument for
Turnout.T h e c o e ﬃcient estimate on Turnout(i.e., -11.05), however, changes
only negligibly from its OLS counterpart - e.g., the p-value from Hausman￿s test
is 0.84.33
These results certainly support Hypothesis 2. But, they do not ￿rmly estab-
lish the case against Turnout￿s potential endogeneity. For example, Hausman￿s
test might incorrectly dismiss this potential if EDR shares an independent re-
lationship with Loops - i.e., if EDR is related to an in￿uential but heretofore
unobserved variable. I begin to address unobservables￿ potential in￿uence in
this regard by adding Open Primary (i.e., an indicator of whether states main-
tain open primaries) to the set of instruments. Open Primary appears to
share a strong ￿rst stage relationship with electoral mobility. Besley and Case
(12) report evidence of such a relationship (e.g., see their Table 5), as does
my Appendix B for the present data. Consequently, if EDR violates the ex-
clusion restriction but Open Primary is truly redundant in equation (10) (or
vice-versa), then the overidenti￿ed estimate of Turnout￿s coeﬃcient should dif-
fer signi￿cantly from it￿s just identi￿ed counterpart in regression (3). Table 2￿s
regression (4) reports an overidenti￿ed estimate with which to formally evaluate
this diﬀerence. In light of results from Whitney Newey and Kenneth West￿s
(47) overidenti￿cation test (i.e., J = 1.01, p-value = 0.32), strong evidence does
not exist here for either instrument alone violating the exclusion restriction.34
While oﬀering additional con￿dence that my identi￿cation strategy validly
addresses Turnout￿s potential endogeneity, this test cannot dismiss a case where
33To estimate this parameter, I implicity assume that EDR￿s "treatment-eﬀect" is ho-
mogenous. Evidence exists, however, that this eﬀect is greatest amongst individuals whose
educational attainment is relatively low (e.g., see Besley and Case(12, p. 25)). In an unre-
ported regression, I address the potential diﬃculty that such heterogeneity might create for
interpreting my reported results by restricting my sample to states whose educational levels
fall outside of Education￿s highest quartile. The coeﬃcient estimate that emerges from this
restricted sample (i.e., -11.95) is essentially identical to that reported here.
34This test result also corroborates evidence reported below from the IV estimate￿s boot-
strapped distribution and corresponding matching estimator that the problem of weak instru-
m e n t sd o e sn o ta ﬄict the present investigation (Hahn and Hausman (32)).
24both EDR and Open Primary share independent relationships with Turnout.
Because received research oﬀers little in the way of prior information with which
to dismiss this case, I gain additional con￿dence that Turnout relates negligi-
bly to in￿uential but omitted variables via Altonji et al.￿s (4) innovation for
evaluating causality from non-experimental data. This innovation stems from
formally comparing omitted variables￿ capacity to select the treatment under
examination (e.g., whether a state receives high turnout) to that same capac-
ity for observables. If observed variables￿ capacity is relatively large, then the
econometrician can gain con￿dence that omitted variables did not select the
treatment of interest. This inference comes from recognizing that, if OVB is
truly innocuous, then an index of omitted variables should not vary systemat-
ically with the variable of interest - e.g., unobservables should not vary across
"high" and "low" turnout states. To the extent, however, that OVB spuriously
creates a relationship of interest, an index of omitted variables should vary with
the variable of interest, and that variation should parallel selection based on
observables. Here, unobservables should exhibit just as much capacity to select
outcomes into high and low turnout states as do observables.
Applied to the question of present interest, Altonji et al.￿s (4, equation (1.3))
method says to compare the following two normalized index-shifts:




E [X0γ | ”high” Turnout] − E [X0γ | ”low” Turnout]
Va r [X0γ]
(12)
where X0γ is a series of ￿tted values that predict Loops without information
about Turnout (i.e., X contains all of regression (2)￿s independent variables
except Turnout), u1 is a series of associated residuals, ”high”Turnout indi-
cates states for which Turnoutexceeds its median, and ”low”Turnoutindicates
states for which Turnoutfalls short of its median. In short, equations (11) and
(12) measure the degrees to which unobservables and observables, respectively,
25vary with electoral mobility in the reduced form model (10). To the extent
that my observed regressors account for selection into high and low turnout
states, the normalized shift of unobservables (11) should thus equal zero and
OVB should not complicate available inference. If, on the other hand, omitted
variables completely rationalize this selection (i.e., my measured relationship
between Turnoutand Loops is entirely attributable to OVB), then this normal-
ized shift should move away from zero and indeed equal the normalized shift of
observables (12). Here, observed and unobserved regressors would exhibit the
same capacity to account for Loops￿ variation with Turnout, and suggest that
available inference is peculiar to my regression speci￿cation.
Appendix C reports detailed data from which these shifts can be calcu-
lated. From these data, the normalized shift in observables￿ magnitude (12)
(i.e., 0.0066) is over three times that of the normalized shift in unobservables
(11) (i.e., -0.0021). This ratio suggests that selection on omitted variables
w o u l dh a v et ob ec o n s i d e r a b l ef o ri n f e r e n c et h a ti sa v a i l a b l ef r o mT a b l e2t ob e
completely spurious. Altonji et al. (4, p. 6) concur by suggesting that the case
for a causal eﬀect is strengthened if selection on unobservables must be several
times stronger than that on observables.
As a ￿nal push in this direction, I evaluate the capacity for a number of
heretofore omitted, but potentially in￿uential, variables to rationalize Turnout￿s
coeﬃcient estimate.35 If, contrary to evidence from my overidenti￿cation test
and application of Altonji et al.￿s (4) method, selection on omitted regressors
is considerable, then Turnout￿s coeﬃcient estimates should be unstable. A
representative set of results reported in Table 3 argues strongly against this
sensitivity.
–—Insert Table 3 Here–—
Coeﬃcient estimates on Turnoutare remarkably stable across a large set of
potentially in￿uential, but heretofore omitted, variables. An important con-
35Besley and Case (12) oﬀer an excellent discussion of how electoral institutions might relate
to policies such as those investigated here through extra-turnout channels.
26sideration in this regard is whether political forces that in￿uence electoral rules
also in￿uence relevant regulatory institutions. If they do, then EDR may
exhibit an independent relationship with Loops. Ia d d r e s st h i sd i ﬃculty by
controlling for whether PUC members are elected or appointed. Including this
control by itself, or interacting it with Turnout, does not alter available infer-
ence (e.g., see Table 3￿s row A). Indeed, the correlation between EDR and a
dummy variable that equals one for states that elect their PUCs is small and
negative. This ￿non-result￿ adds con￿dence that correlation with an omitted
measure of relevant regulatory structures does not compromise EDR￿s validity
as an instrument.36
EDR could also be problematic if my regressors do not control for variation
in electorates￿ ideologies, and these ideologies in￿uence both electoral rules and
policy outcomes. Inter-state heterogeneity of ideologies indeed appears con-
siderable (e.g., see Besley and Case (12)). To the extent, however, that all
electoral members prefer lower prices, such variation may not be important for
the present application. In this light, telecommunications policies appear "pli-
able" in that they are available to all politicians as a tool for attracting swing
voters.37 I evaluate this conjecture by omitting observations on Idaho and
North Dakota from the sample. In addition to being able to register on elec-
tion day (or not having to register at all), prospective voters from these states
maintain some of the most conservative measured opinions in the US (e.g., see
Robert Erikson, Gerald Wright, and John McIver (20) and Wright et al. (70)).38
36Employing similar arguments to those that appear in the "turnout and distribution" liter-
ature, Besley and Stephen Coate (13) develop evidence that electoral constituencies recognize
signi￿cantly lower electricity prices in US states that elect (rather than appoint) relevant reg-
ulators. Susan Smart (63) develops analogous evidence for the telecommunications sector.
To the extent that my Hypothesis 2 characterizes our empirical reality, extending this received
evidence to the present research suggests that telecommunications capital stocks should be
relatively low, ceteris paribus, in states that elect their PUC members. In unreported re-
gressions, coeﬃcient estimates￿ signs are consistent with this implication, but the estimates
themselves are not always signi￿cant.
37S m a r t( 6 3 )o ﬀers evidence that telecom policies may indeed be pliable in this regard.
She ￿nds, for example, that basic service rates do not diﬀer signi￿cantly across the parties of
gubernatorial PUC-appointers.
38Other states for which EDR equals one do not vary considerably in their liberal-opinon
measures and these measures are centrally located in the distribution of opinions across states
(Erikson et al. (20), Wright et al. (70)).
27Extending my analysis further in this direction, I also omit observations on Min-
nesota and Wisconsin. While these states￿ electorates maintain moderate policy
preferences, their parties￿ leaders appear relatively liberal (Erikson et al. (20)).
Constraining the sample in both cases, nevertheless, leaves Turnout￿s coeﬃcient
estimate essentially unchanged (see Table 3￿s rows B and C).
All of the other estimates on Turnoutreported in Table 3 (and many others
that are not reported) exhibit a similar robustness. If EDR relates to Loops
via any of the associated "unobserved" variables, then inference from my IV
estimates could be biased. Coeﬃcient estimates on Turnout, nevertheless,
remain stable across each expansion of the regressor-set. This stability implies
that Turnout￿s coeﬃcient estimate is unlikely to change, even upon introducing
a yet unspeci￿ed variable (Altonji et al. (4), Jonah Gelbach (28)).
As a ￿nal check on my identi￿cation strategy￿s validity, I consider the poten-
tial for the IV estimator￿s ￿nite sample properties to introduce bias. Performing
this check is important because the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator can
be biased in ￿nite samples (even if the exclusion restriction is satis￿ed), and this
bias is towards the corresponding OLS estimate.
Id os o￿rst by bootstrapping the distribution of Turnout￿s 2SLS coeﬃcient
estimate, the result of which is reported in Figure 3.39
–—Insert Figure 3 Here–—
This distribution￿s mean (i.e., -10.66) implies that the bias-corrected estimate
of Turnout￿s coeﬃcient is essentially identical to the corresponding IV estimate
reported in Table 2 (i.e., -11.05 in regression (3)). In this light, inference that
can be drawn from Table 2￿s regressions does not appear to be a ￿nite sample
artifact.
Finally, I evaluate Turnout￿s relationship with Loops via the nearest neigh-
bor matching estimator - i.e., an estimator whose validity is unrelated to sample
size considerations. I do so by interpreting states for which EDR equals one as
39Joel Horowitz (39), amongst others, rationalizes this treatment of the potential for ￿nite-
sample bias.
28receiving a "high electoral mobility" treatment and then estimate from a linear
probability model each state￿s propensity to receive such treatment.40 These
"propensity scores" are conditioned on the above described controls for demand
side forces, supply side forces, and other interests￿ capacity to exert political
in￿uence (i.e., control variables included in regressions (2) - (4)). In light of the
South￿s historical aversion to institutions that would facilitate electoral mobility
(e.g., see Besley and Case (12); Key (40)), I also condition this propensity on an
indicator of the 11 states that attempted secession during the US￿s civil war.
For each treated state, I then measure the linear distance between the own-
propensity score and that of each other state. The non-treatment state that
minimizes this distance becomes the treatment state￿s "nearest neighbor." The
nearest neighbor matching estimator measures the diﬀerence in outcomes (i.e.,
Loops) that is attributable to electoral mobility as the average diﬀerence in
outcomes between treated observations and their nearest neighbors (e.g., see
Blundell and Costa-Dias (14)).
For the speci￿cation described above, this diﬀerence implies that LECs in
treated states maintain about 133 less loops per 1,000 population (i.e., about
one standard deviation in Loops) than do LECs in untreated states. If unob-
servables negligibly in￿uenced states￿ selection into "high turnout" electorates,41
and each state has a non-zero probability of being treated, then this variation
in outcomes between high and low turnout states is attributable to increased
electoral mobility in treated states. Under these conditions, and if treatment
responses are homogenous, a standard deviation increase in Turnout would
cause nearly a 7/8 standard deviation decrease in Loops. Again, evidence that
emerges from my addressing Turnout￿s potential endogeneity via the EDR
instrument does not appear to be an artifact of my sample￿s relatively small
size.
40Recall from Appendix B￿s estimates that "treated" states exhibit, on average, just over a
standard deviation increase in Turnout.
41Evidence reported below from Altonji et al.￿s (4) method formally evaluates the extent to
which the present speci￿cation satis￿es this condition.
293.4 Structural Evidence
Reduced form evidence of Turnout￿s relationship with Loops is consistent with
Hypothesis 2 and robust across several considerations of how endogeneity bias
might render that evidence spurious. While persuasive in this regard, however,
it does not explicitly evaluate my theoretical motivation where regulated prices
channel electoral pressures to LEC￿s capital decisions. Received evidence in the
turnout and distribution literature, and Falaschetti (23) in particular, ￿lls part
of this lacuna by supporting at least the ￿rst half of this structure￿s empirical
relevance - i.e., electoral pressures act on regulated prices. I conclude the
present section by attempting to close this gap more completely.
I do so by estimating parameters from the following recursive system where
prices at which electoral constituents connect to the telecommunications net-
work (i.e., ConnectionCharge) depend on Turnoutand, in turn, Loops depend
on Connection Charge.
Connection Chargei = β0 + β1Turnouti +
XK
k=2 βkControlsk,i + u2 (13)
Loopsi = γ0 + γ1Connection Chargei +
XK
k=2 γkControlsk,i + u3 (14)
In principle, Connection Charge appears to be exactly the variable with which
Loops shares a structural relationship (e.g., see my Section 2 and Parsons (53)).
Doing so comes at a considerable degrees of freedom cost, however, since this
variable is observable for only 38 states.42 My estimated structural relationships
thus exhibit some loss of eﬃciency vis-a-vis their reduced form counterparts. In
addition, since ConnectionChargeis observable for only 3 of the 7 EDR-states,
42Connection Charge equals the average price that end-users from 1996-1998 paid to con-
nect the telecommunications network. While this price should be closely associated with the
decision to supply loops, it can only be observed for states that contain at least one of the 95
urban areas surveyed for the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index (CPI)
in 1988 (Brown (16)).
30I do not report any IV-results in Table 4.43
–—Insert Table 4 Here–—
My speci￿cation of regression (5.1) follows that of Falaschetti (23) and
produces qualitatively similar evidence - e.g., a standard deviation increase
in Turnout is associated with just over a 1/3 standard deviation decrease in
ConnectionCharge. In turn, the coeﬃcient estimate on ConnectionChargein
regression (5.2) suggests that this increase in Turnoutis associated with about
a 1/8 standard deviation decrease in Loops. This relationship￿s qualitative
nature appears robust to introducing demographic controls in regressions (6.1)
and (6.2). Here, the ￿rst equation￿s coeﬃcient estimate on Turnout remains
negative, but becomes statistically insigni￿cant (p-value = 0.22). The nega-
tive relationship between Connection Charge and Loops, on the other hand,
maintains its statistical signi￿cance. Coupled with evidence from Falaschetti
(23) that prices for local exchange services decrease signi￿cantly with increases
in electoral mobility,44 evidence reported here on Turnout￿s relationship to
Connection Charge and Connection Charge￿s relationship to Loops further
corroborates my reduced form evidence for Hypothesis 2.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Evidence from the "institutions and commitment" literature suggests that polit-
ical agents￿ opportunistic potential can signi￿cantly reduce productive activity.
43In light of the insigni￿cance of Hausman￿s test statistic (see Table 2) and the IV estimates￿
robustness to considerations of both small and large sample bias (see regressions 4 and 5),
the potential for Turnout￿s endogeneity to bias inference here appears negligible. Indeed,
unreported IV estimates, as well as estimates from samples that exclude states for which EDR
equals one, are qualitatively similar to those reported here.
44Prices that Falaschetti (23) investigates are paid monthly by end-users to remunerate
LECs for recurring service costs. This variable includes revenues from interstate and in-
trastate monthly service, local calling, connection charges, vertical features, inside wiring
maintenance, and other local exchange services (source: email correspondence with Jim Eis-
ner of the FCC). As such, it is a relatively noisy proxy of remuneration that LECs receive
in return for supplying loops. Nevertheless, evidence that Falaschetti (23) produces remains
relevant for my present application since the regulatory process through which regulators set
local exchange and connection prices are similar.
31North and Weingast (51) oﬀer a seminal contribution in this regard. Left uncon-
strained, England￿s 17th century monarchy could not credibly commit against
reneging on debt obligations or con￿scating capital investments￿ product. This
condition encouraged a ￿Glorious Revolution￿ that saw political authority de-
volve to Parliament and an independent judiciary. By insulating investors￿
product from expropriation-risk, this devolution spurred a marked increase in
England￿s real activity.
Others have formalized and extended North and Weingast￿s insight. Henisz
(36), for example, formally measures political constraints by, in eﬀect, carefully
counting the number of "veto points" that characterize a country￿s polity. He
also shows that this measure exhibits a signi￿cant and positive relationship with
economic growth. Henisz rationalizes this evidence much like North and Wein-
gast do theirs ￿ i.e., increasing the number of veto players encourages productive
economic activity by increasing the cost for political agents to coordinate oppor-
tunistic actions and thus insulating investors￿ product from expropriation.45
While the "institutions and commitment" literature suggests that political
agents￿ opportunistic potential can retard real economic activity, however, it is
silent about whether the analogous potential for these agents￿ principals exerts
a similar in￿uence. Interestingly, several scholars address how principals￿ ex-
propriation threat constrains investment activity in the formally related setting
of shareholders and managers (e.g., see Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb, and Fausto
Panunzi (17), Falaschetti (21), Charles Knoeber (41), and Andrei Shleifer and
Lawrence Summers (62)). Electoral principals￿ capacity to act in this manner,
nevertheless, appears relatively unexplored. I begin to address this gap in the
present paper.
On its face, received evidence that distributive policy favors mobile elec-
torates may suggest that electorates￿ welfare increases monotonically with voter
turnout. Increasing electoral mobility need not induce superior outcomes, how-
ever, when the same evidence is evaluated within the "institutions and commit-
45Acemoglu et al. (2), Falaschetti (22), (24), Henisz and Zelner (37), and Stasavage (65)
oﬀer related evidence. Aghion et al. (3) and Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland, and Guido
Tabellini (56) oﬀer corresponding theoretical treatments.
32ment" framework. Here, real activity can decrease when political agents face a
relatively low cost of pursuing opportunistic incentives. One might thus expect
similar decreases where electoral principals face analogously low mobilization
costs.
By essentially synthesizing insights from the institutions-and-commitment
and turnout-and-distribution literatures, I evaluate a policy-strategy that is
now popularly, and often uncritically, characterized as dominant - i.e., increas-
ing electoral mobility. Interestingly, social scientists since at least the Federalist
Paper￿s authors (31) have appreciated majorities￿ potential to act tyrannically.
Robust evidence that I develop here suggests that this frequently cited possi-
bility may be easier to realize than popular accounts of mobility￿s normative
properties suggest.
The present research thus encourages a more cautious normative reading of
evidence that distributive policy favors high turnout electorates. More gen-
erally, it suggests that political opportunism￿s real eﬀects may not have po-
litical agents as their only source. This suggestion is important because the
institutions and commitment literature tends to draw reformers￿ attention to
constraining political agents￿ opportunistic potential. Unbound by similar con-
straints, however, electoral principals might eﬀectively control their political
agents while signi￿cantly retarding their economic agents￿ productive incentives
(especially those who operate in highly regulated sectors). An important ob-
jective for future research is to improve our understanding of this trade-oﬀ￿s
welfare implications. Moving the present investigation to an international set-
ting, where costs of electoral participation may lie outside the bounds of those
observed across US states, could be instructive in this regard.
335A p p e n d i x A - D a t a
–—Insert Table A Here–—
346 Appendix B - First Stage Results
–—Insert Table B Here–—
357A p p e n d i x C - E v a l u a t i n g O V B
–—Insert Table C Here–—
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Loops  Number of loops per 1,000 population that incumbent  
  local exchange carriers (ILECs), subject to price cap  
  regulation, maintained on December 31, 2000 
 
Turnout  Average percentage of voting age individuals that cast  
  ballots for the office of president in the 1992, 1996, and  
  2000 general elections.   
 
Election Day Registration Indicator of states in which prospective voters can  
(EDR)  register on election day.   
 
Population Density  Population per square mile.   
 
Education  Percent of 1990 population, 25 years and older, that  
  graduated high school.   
 
Income   1990 per capita personal income (in 000’s).   
 
Poverty   Percent of 1989 families with income below poverty line.  
  
Age 65  Perecent of 1990 population aged 65 and over.   
 
LEC Concentration  Percentage of zip codes without any competitive local  
  exchange carriers (CLECs).   
 
LD Concentration  Herfindahl-Hirschman index of long distance service  
  providers' market shares.   
 
Fortune 500  Number of Fortune 500 headquarters in 1999.   
 
Loop Cost  Monthly cost of maintaining a loop in 1996.   
 
 Appendix B 
First Stage Regression Results 
Dependent Variable = Turnout  
 
Variable  Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE  
Constant -27.5626 20.5994  -38.5157 21.0026* 
EDR 8.2953 2.0311***  7.0877 1.8768*** 
Open Primary    3.5525 1.3885*** 
Population Density  0.0018 0.0049 -0.0018 0.0041 
Education 0.8316 0.1787***  0.7985 0.1639*** 
Income 0.1813 0.4716  0.6472 0.4669 
Poverty 0.7194 0.4343  0.7480 0.4042* 
Age 65  1.0946 0.4925**  1.2800 0.4362*** 
LEC Concentration  0.0095 0.0300  0.0131 0.0259 
LD Concentration  0.4770 8.5427  -1.6748 8.7031 
Fortune 500  -0.1031 0.0785  -0.1078 0.0686 
Loop Cost  -0.2745 0.2541  -0.2069 0.2153 
           
N  48   48  
R
2 0.66    0.71   
Adj. R
2 0.57    0.62   
y   54.69   54.69  
y σ   6.52  6.52  
F-stat. 7.11    8.07   
Prob(F-stat.) 0.00  0.00  
 
Notes:  ***, **, and * indicate confidence at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.  
Coefficients are estimated via OLS and standard errors are White-consistent. 
 Appendix C 
Evaluating Omitted Variables Bias 
Summary Statistics for High and Low Turnout States 
 
 
High Turnout States 
 















Sum N/A  N/A  7.00 N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Mean 616.96  60.18 0.29  153.74  79.34 17.76 8.9212.78 45.17 0.24 6.2922.88
Median 633.68  59.28  0.00  53.14  80.05 17.50 8.5013.30 47.50 0.24 3.0022.89
Max 829.04  70.41 1.00 958.22  85.10 25.40 19.4015.40 96.00 0.38 28.0036.30
Min 366.13 54.90  0.00  4.79  68.30 13.99 4.40 8.70 0.00 0.09 0.0015.67
SD 110.07  3.81  0.46  259.95  4.00 2.51 2.89 1.67 29.33 0.07 7.45 4.77
 
 
Low Turnout States 
 















Sum N/A  N/A  0.00 N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A N/A N/A
Mean 679.43  49.19 0.00 190.11  72.64 17.52 11.1712.58 41.17 0.27  13.4222.89
Median 649.43  49.56  0.00 120.78  74.65 16.82 10.7012.60 39.50 0.27  6.5023.61
Max 975.69  53.77 0.00 1,054.09  78.80 24.88 20.2018.30 100.00 0.41  58.0030.85
Min 446.58 44.03  0.00 12.17  64.30 12.83 5.6010.10 2.00 0.15  0.0015.40
SD 134.09  3.04  0.00 222.03  4.76 3.08 3.84 1.94 33.03 0.07  17.25 5.19
 Appendix C (continued) 
Evaluating Omitted Variables Bias 
 Selection on Observables vs. Unobservables 
 
Rank State LOOPS TURNOUT  u1  X'γ 
1 ME  586.1  70.4  91.44 1,324.0
2 MN  624.2  68.2  48.13 1,378.8
3 MT  475.0  64.6  -18.19 1,253.5
4 WI  529.9  64.2  -16.71 1,302.6
5 VT  630.8  63.2  -1.43 1,376.6
6 SD  389.9  61.9  -115.38 1,234.6
7 IA  528.1  61.2 -53.22 1,302.6
8 ND  366.1  61.2  -118.75 1,206.0
9 OR  688.0  61.2  46.66 1,361.8
10 NH  718.6  61.0  -55.91 1,492.7
11 WY  572.8  60.5  -52.33 1,337.5
12 CT  770.8  59.7  -50.89 1,524.6
13 ID  676.4  58.9 114.55 1,255.5
14 NE  563.1  58.5  -87.78 1,340.4
15 MI  664.2  57.9  8.70 1,337.4
16 MO  650.0  57.8  91.64 1,239.5
17 KS  636.5  57.7  -34.97 1,351.4
18 MA  755.5  57.6  -39.47 1,473.2
19 WA  691.3  57.2  -40.18 1,405.4
20 LA  565.1  57.0  62.33 1,174.4
21 OH  586.2  56.9  14.07 1,242.5
22 CO  829.0  56.8  77.24 1,420.9
23 UT  649.5  55.9  3.28 1,304.6
24 RI  659.8  54.9  24.62 1,281.8  
Rank State LOOPS TURNOUT  u1  X'γ 
25 DE 866.8 53.8  170.79 1,329.4
26 IL 683.4 53.7  -2.50 1,318.0
27 NJ 884.4 52.8  24.21 1,481.6
28 OK 581.6 52.7  -14.18 1,217.0
29 PA 626.7 52.3  -32.04 1,274.6
30 VA 738.6 51.1  1.44 1,339.4
31 IN 626.1 51.0  -41.26 1,268.3
32 AL 563.1 51.0  9.49 1,153.9
33 KY 539.7 50.9  32.54 1,106.8
34 MD 798.1 50.6  -71.48 1,465.4
35 FL 837.6 49.9  109.75 1,315.4
36 NY 714.5 49.6  -35.54 1,334.2
37 AR 446.6 49.5  -47.43 1,077.4
38 TN 619.1 49.5  35.65 1,166.6
39 MS 518.7 48.9  -23.78 1,118.7
40 NC 652.3 48.6  -5.15 1,230.5
41 NM 609.5 48.2  -5.25 1,181.9
42 WV 565.9 47.1  38.64 1,082.2
43 AZ 809.7 46.6  61.24 1,297.4
44 CA 762.8 45.8  -13.56 1,315.9
45 TX 724.5 44.5  40.28 1,208.6
46 SC 514.3 44.4  -131.26 1,168.3
47 GA 646.5 44.1  -98.29 1,264.8
48 NV 975.7 44.0  100.25 1,394.1  
 LOOPS TURNOUT u1  X'γ 
Mean(All) 648.2 54.7 0.0 1,292.4 
Mean(High) 617.0 60.2 -4.3 1,330.1 
Mean(Low) 679.4 49.2 4.3 1,254.6 
Variance 15,723 42.5 4,190 11,459 
Normalized Shift    -0.0020 0.0066   
 Figure 1 




To the extent that a political agent’s utility is 
sensitive to consumer’s surplus, regulators will push 
prices below their competitive levels P* as long as 
the consequent increase in consumer surplus (B) 
exceeds that which is foregone (A).  Over this 
range, electoral mobility will exhibit a negative 
relationship with output.   
 Figure 2 
Loops vs. Turnout 














 Figure 3 
Bootstrapped Distribution of the 2SLS  













Upper-Bound 90% Confidence Interval -2.59
Lower-Bound 90% Confidence Interval -19.24
 
Notes:  Election Day Registration ( EDR) 
instruments for the potentially endogenous 
regressor,  Turnout.  Confidence intervals are 
calculated via the percentile method.  The 
hypothesis that the mean equals zero can be 
rejected at any reasonable level of confidence (t-






















N 48  48  48  48 48 48.00 48 48 48  48 48 48
Sum N/A  N/A  7.00  N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A N/A N/A
Mean 648.19  54.69  0.15  171.92  75.99 17.64 10.0 12.7 43.2 0.26 9.8522.88
Median 641.53  54.33  0.00  79.38  76.70 17.39 9.2 12.7 44.0 0.24 4.5023.15
Max 975.69  70.41  1.00 1,054.09  85.10 25.40 20.2 18.3 100.0 0.41 58.0036.30
Min 366.13 44.03  0.00  4.79  64.30 12.83 4.4 8.7 0.0 0.09 0.0015.40
SD 125.39  6.52  0.36  239.85  5.51 2.78 3.6 1.8 31.0 0.07 13.63 4.93
Source F  B  B  C  C C C C D  G E A
 
A. Falaschetti  2003(a) 
B.  Federal Election Commission 2003 
C.  Geospatial and Statistical Data Center (GEOSTAT)  
D.  Local Telephone Competition 2002 - Table 13    
E.  Savageau and D'Agostino 1999 
F.  Trends in Telephone Service 2002 – Table 8.2 
G.  Author calculated from Trends in Telephone Service 2002 – Table 10.11 Table 2 
Reduced Form Evidence 





Coeff. SE   
(2) 
OLS 
Coeff. SE  
(3) 
2SLS
Coeff. SE  
(4) 
2SLS 
Coeff. SE   
Constant 974.34  154.27  *** 121.66 400.14 141.26 423.33 137.48  377.75 
Turnout -5.96  2.73  **  -11.86 2.64*** -11.05 4.77** -12.68 4.32*** 
Population  Density      -0.05 0.06  -0.05 0.06  -0.05  0.06 
Education      9.52 3.58*** 8.82 4.71*  10.23  4.62** 
Income      30.15 8.36*** 30.19 8.31***  30.11  8.28*** 
Poverty      2.57 6.21  2.36 6.27 2.78  6.68 
Age  65      -2.85 9.38  -3.74 10.40  -1.94  9.66 
LEC  Concentration      -0.73 0.58  -0.74 0.60  -0.71  0.59 
LD  Concentration      102.75 174.69  102.71 176.17  102.79  173.65 
Fortune  500      -2.13 1.02**  -2.06 1.13*  -2.21  1.10** 
Loop  Cost      -1.51 3.03  -1.43 3.19  -1.59  3.01 
                 
N  48     48   48   48    
R
2  0.10     0.74   NA   NA    
Adj. R
2  0.08     0.66   NA   NA    
y   648.19     648.19   648.19   648.19 
y σ   125.39     125.39   125.39   125.39 
F-stat.  4.89     10.27   NA   NA 
Prob(F-stat.)  0.03     0.00   NA   NA 
Prob(Hausman)  NA     0.84   NA   NA 
Prob(J-stat)  NA    NA   NA   0.32 
  
 
***, **, and * indicate confidence at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.  
Standard errors are White-consistent.     Table 3 
Evaluating the Stability of Turnout’s Coefficient Estimate 














A  Indicator of elected public utility commissioner (PUC)  -12.53  3.74 *** 
B  Omit observations on ID and ND  -11.93  3.28 *** 
C  Omit observations on MN and WI  -13.70  5.85 ** 
D  Index of state level campaign contribution limits  -12.58  4.49 *** 
E  Indicator of direct electoral access to ballot initiative  -12.48  4.71 *** 
F  Indicator of no gubernatorial term limits  -11.76  4.31 *** 
G  Index of polity’s competitiveness (outcomes)  -12.12  4.09 *** 
H  Regulatory history (change to incentive regulation)  -12.89  4.27 *** 
I  Average unified party control of state government  -12.67  4.36 *** 
J  Electorate's revealed party preferences (%-Clinton 1992) -12.56  4.37 *** 
K  Regional dummy for western states  -11.98  5.41 ** 
L  Regional dummy for southern states  -12.82  4.40 *** 
M Population  -12.51  4.79  *** 
N  Number of households  -12.43  4.83 *** 
O  Percent of population that is white  -13.42  4.92 *** 
P  Indicator of significant consumer advocacy presence  -12.72  4.37 *** 
Q  Net universal service subsidies  -12.73  4.36 ** 
 
Notes:  ***, **, and * indicate confidence at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.  
The regressor matrix includes all of the covariates reported in Table 2.  Instruments for 
Turnout are EDR and Open Primary.  Qualitatively similar results appear when EDR acts 
as a single instrument or if the coefficient estimate on Turnout is estimated via OLS.   
 Table 4.1 
Structural Evidence 
Dependent Variable = Connection Charge 




Coeff. SE  
(6.1) 
Coeff. SE  
Constant 69.37 24.26***  57.86 45.16 
Turnout -0.56 0.26**  -0.39 0.31 
Population Density       -0.01 0.01 
Education       -0.66 0.46 
Income     2.56 1.25** 
Poverty     0.53 0.86 
Age 65        0.14 0.83 
LEC Concentration -0.09 0.05*  -0.05 0.06 
LD Concentration  5.22 24.00  14.88 24.02 
Fortune 500  0.15 0.14  0.01 0.17 
Loop Cost  0.04 0.43  -0.01 0.53 
         
N  38   38  
R
2  0.27  0.39  
Adj. R
2  0.15  0.17  
y   39.85   39.85  
y σ   10.55   10.55  
 
Note:  ***, **, and * indicate confidence at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.   
 Table 4.2 
Structural Evidence 
Dependent Variable = Loops 




Coeff. SE  
(6.2) 
Coeff. SE  
Constant 633.80 103.84*** 666.58 104.33*** 
Connection Charge 3.88 1.50*** 3.17 1.52** 
Loop Cost  -6.12 3.40*  -6.31 3.40* 
         
N  38   38  
R
2  0.13   0.15  
Adj. R
2  0.08   0.10  
y   649.95   649.95  
y σ   106.70   106.70  
 
Note:  ***, **, and * indicate confidence at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.   
 
 